Israel’s\u00a0 Water Challenge<\/h1>\n\n\n\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\nDecember\u00a0 25, 2013 | 0753 <\/i> Print <\/a> Text\u00a0 Size<\/div>\n\n\n\n![\"Israel's](\"http:\/\/www.stratfor.com\/sites\/default\/files\/styles\/640_scale_width\/public\/main\/images\/2_82568025.jpg?itok=80ETMfvR\" "\\"Israel's")
<\/div>\n\nFilters at\u00a0 the Ashkelon seawater reverse\u00a0 osmosis plant south of Tel Aviv in 2008. (DAVID\u00a0 BUIMOVITCH\/AFP\/Getty\u00a0 Images)<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Summary<\/h2>\n\nIsrael’s successful efforts to increase water\u00a0 security will lessen one of the country’s geographical constraints. But\u00a0 new sources of water are more\u00a0 energy intensive, and this could increase Israel’s short-term dependence on\u00a0 energy imports unless domestic energy sources are successfully\u00a0 developed.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n
\n\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Analysis<\/h2>\n\nWhile Israel\u00a0 enjoys relative\u00a0national security<\/a>\u00a0compared to its neighbors, which\u00a0 are struggling with internal\u00a0 fragmentation, this will\u00a0probably change eventually. Because concerted military efforts\u00a0 have been required in the past to secure water resources, Israel has had a\u00a0 strong incentive to develop technological solutions to improve water security. Additional domestic water\u00a0 resources — including increasing desalination capacity and continued efforts to\u00a0 recycle water — allow Israel to\u00a0 mitigate one of its inherent geographic constraints.<\/p>\nIsrael has substantially increased its capacity to desalinize water over the\u00a0 last decade. The arid country of roughly 8 million already has a number of\u00a0 desalination plants — including the Sorek plant, the world’s largest\u00a0 desalination plant of its kind, which became fully operational in\u00a0October. Israel has plans to increase total desalination\u00a0 capacity\u00a0through 2020 such that it approaches the estimated annual amount\u00a0 of internally generated natural\u00a0 water resources.<\/p>\n
Naturally Occurring Water<\/strong><\/h3>\nIsrael’s total annual internal renewable natural sources of fresh water stand at 0.75 billion cubic meters. It has\u00a0 roughly 265 cubic meters per year of water per person available. This\u00a0 is\u00a0well below the U.N. definition of water poverty, which is anything below\u00a0 1,000 cubic meters per person per year.<\/p>\n
For groundwater, Israel relies on two main aquifers: the Coastal Aquifer and\u00a0 the Mountain Aquifer (which is further divided into subaquifers). Both also lie\u00a0 under the Palestinian territory — in Gaza and the West Bank,\u00a0 respectively.<\/p>\n
\n\n![\"\"](\"http:\/\/www.stratfor.com\/sites\/default\/files\/styles\/embedded_graphic\/public\/main\/images\/2_Israel_920%20%281%29.jpg?itok=mcCx_p1e\" "\\"\\"")
<\/a><\/div>\n\u00a0 Click to Enlarge<\/a><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\nIsrael’s surface water is concentrated mainly in the north and east of the\u00a0 country.\u00a0Israel is part of the Jordan River system, which also includes\u00a0 Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the West Bank. The major rivers in the upper part of\u00a0 the basin include the Hasbani, Banias and the Dan rivers. These rivers converge\u00a0 to form the Jordan River near the border of Israel, Lebanon and Syria before\u00a0 flowing into the Sea of Galilee. Downstream, the Jordan River is further fed by\u00a0 the major tributaries of the Yarmouk and Zarqa rivers.<\/p>\n
Crucially, more than half of Israel’s\u00a0total natural water originates\u00a0 outside its borders: 310\u00a0million cubic meters come from Lebanon, 375 million cubic\u00a0 meters come from Syria and 345 million cubic meters originate in the West Bank.\u00a0 All the countries in this arid region compete for the limited resources of the\u00a0 basin. The Palestinian Authority has between 51 cubic meters per person and 333\u00a0 cubic meters per person per year depending on location, while Syria and Lebanon\u00a0 receive water from additional river systems and operate at 882 cubic meters per\u00a0 year per person and 1,259 cubic meters per year per person, respectively. Jordan\u00a0 has 161 cubic meters per year per person.<\/p>\n
Allocations of water from transboundary river systems are often disputed. The\u00a0 last basin-wide allocation scheme for the Jordan River system came in 1955 with\u00a0 the Jordan Valley Unified Water Plan (also known as the Johnston Plan, named\u00a0 after the American ambassador involved in negotiations). By allocating water\u00a0 based primarily on agricultural demand, the plan offered a compromise between\u00a0 participating nations. However, because many of the Arab states did not want to\u00a0 recognize Israel, the plan was never ratified. Attitudes toward cooperative\u00a0 distribution strategies continued to sour during the construction of Israel’s\u00a0 National Water Carrier, which diverted water from the Sea of Galilee to other\u00a0 points in Israel. However, Jordan and Israel have used the Unified Plan as the\u00a0 basis for subsequent negotiations.<\/p>\n
As one of the downstream riparian nations in the basin, protecting Israel’s\u00a0 northern borders is essential to maintaining control of surface water resources.\u00a0 Maintaining control of the Golan Heights not only gives Israel a military\u00a0 advantage in dealing with adversaries to the north, it also helps to guarantee\u00a0 access to the Sea of Galilee.<\/p>\n
Israel historically has demonstrated a willingness to use military force to\u00a0 guarantee access to water resources. In 1964, Syria, with the support of the\u00a0 Arab League, began devising plans to divert the Banias River, threatening\u00a0 roughly 10 percent of Israel’s water supply at the time. From 1965-1967, Israel\u00a0 launched attacks to destroy the diversion projects under construction in an\u00a0 effort to maintain access to the water source.<\/p>\n
Water rights and distribution parameters were included in the 1994 peace\u00a0 treaty between Israel and Jordan. The Oslo II agreement in 1995 between Israel\u00a0 and the Palestinian National Authority also outlined parameters for water\u00a0 cooperation in the West Bank, but in practice, joint management has often failed\u00a0 and the Palestinian population remains heavily dependent on Israel for access to\u00a0 water.<\/p>\n
These treaties also did not remove Israel’s imperative to ensure continued\u00a0 access to water resources, nor its willingness to threaten military action to\u00a0 ensure it. In 2002, villages in southern Lebanon installed small pumping\u00a0 stations and irrigation pipelines on the Hasbani River. Ariel Sharon, Israeli\u00a0 prime minister at the time, claimed these actions constituted a “case for war”\u00a0 and threated military action. While no action was taken, the posturing\u00a0 illustrates Israel’s wariness of upstream water management schemes.<\/p>\n
Expanding Sources of Water: Conservation and\u00a0 Desalination<\/strong><\/h3>\nThe foundations of Israel’s current water infrastructure system were laid in\u00a0 the 1950s and 1960s, when Israel faced a more volatile security situation.\u00a0 Subsequent decades saw further development of the efficient use of water and the\u00a0 development of alternative sources. As a result, Israel has expanded internal\u00a0 water resources without expanding its physical borders, helping mitigate the\u00a0 risk of international confrontations over water.<\/p>\n
\n![\"\"](\"http:\/\/brightcove.vo.llnwd.net\/d21\/unsecured\/media\/1160327040001\/201312\/783\/1160327040001_2965630808001_thumbnail-template.jpg?pubId=1160327040001\")
<\/p>\nVideo:<\/strong> Preserving\u00a0 the Dead Sea<\/a><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\nTo the same end, Israel has also developed a highly organized water\u00a0 management system, effectively integrating the whole country. An early project\u00a0 known as the National Water Carrier, which comprises a series of canals,\u00a0 pipelines and pumping stations, moves water from the Sea of Galilee in the\u00a0 comparatively water-rich north to areas of higher demand and greater need in the\u00a0 central and southern zones.<\/p>\n
Israel is also a pioneer and global leader in water-efficient irrigation\u00a0 technology. Because agriculture remains the largest water consumer in the\u00a0 country, efficient use in this sector is necessary for continued sustainable\u00a0 water management. In addition to the irrigation technology, by effectively\u00a0 treating roughly 400 million cubic meters of wastewater, using it mostly to\u00a0 irrigate crops, Israel further reduces pressure on water resources.<\/p>\n
Although Israel has used desalination technology on a smaller scale since the\u00a0 1960s, the push for a substantial increase in desalination capacity began only\u00a0 after a major drought in 1998-1999. Several droughts over the course of the last\u00a0 15 years drove home the vulnerability of Israel’s water supply. Meanwhile, the\u00a0 overuse of groundwater resources, especially of the Coastal Aquifer, is\u00a0 degrading the quality of the water.<\/p>\n
Israel currently consumes just under 2 billion cubic meters of water per\u00a0 year, and while water management has the ability to improve the efficiency of\u00a0 water usage, increasing populations in the region will continue to pressure\u00a0 these limited resources. These factors combined have pushed Israel toward\u00a0 desalination.<\/p>\n
When the Sorek plant became fully operational in\u00a0October, Israel gained\u00a0 150 million cubic meters per year of desalination capacity. Total seawater\u00a0 desalination capacity is expected to reach 600 million cubic meters per year by\u00a0 2015 and could reach 750 million cubic meters per year by 2020. The production\u00a0 cost of desalinized water depends on the plant, but averages $0.65 per cubic\u00a0 meter, with the new Sorek plant costing roughly $0.50 per cubic meter. This is\u00a0 compared to $0.15-$0.45 for water from natural sources.\u00a0Advances in the\u00a0 technology that Israel uses, including technologies that improve the energy\u00a0 efficiency of the plants, have helped drive the costs down compared to previous\u00a0 desalination technology. But desalinated water remains far more energy-intensive\u00a0 than naturally sourced water, and it increases demands for power on the\u00a0 national\u00a0electricity\u00a0grid and from independent natural gas\u00a0 generators.<\/p>\n
Short-Term Dependence on Imported Energy<\/strong><\/h3>\nBecause Israel has traditionally been an energy importer, increasing reliance\u00a0 on an energy-intensive water resource could in turn increase Israel’s dependence on energy-exporting\u00a0 nations. Natural gas will likely be the predominant fuel used to produce\u00a0 desalinated water. The Israeli electrical grid is projected to shift further\u00a0 toward natural gas and away from coal in the coming years, while the\u00a0 desalination plants often independently employ natural gas generators.<\/p>\n
The total fuel required will vary based both on the type of desalination plant, as well as the type of power\u00a0 generation. Even with newer, more efficient equipment, the operation of more\u00a0 than 500 million cubic meters of desalination capacity could require more than\u00a0 100 million cubic meters of natural gas or the equivalent energy from some other\u00a0 fuel sources to produce the additional power necessary to run the plants.<\/p>\n
Israel had previously been an importer of natural gas, but the total volume\u00a0 of imports has declined in recent years. As of\u00a0August 2013, imports were\u00a0 only accounting for 13 percent of total consumption. Furthermore, offshore\u00a0 discoveries in the eastern Mediterranean, including the Leviathan fields\u00a0 projected to come online as early as 2016, mean Israel has the potential to\u00a0 become a natural gas exporter. While there are many political and technical\u00a0 constraints surrounding the development and subsequent use of these\u00a0 fields<\/a>,\u00a0increased levels of domestic energy production could reduce dependence on\u00a0 foreign partners in terms of energy. This is especially important as Israel\u00a0 pursues a strategy of relying on more energy-intensive water resources.<\/p>\nOutlook<\/strong><\/h3>\nIsrael traditionally requires a third-party\u00a0sponsor to survive.\u00a0And\u00a0 even with the added desalination capacity, Israel may still need to use water\u00a0 from external sources. But it has successfully adjusted to the environment and\u00a0 better insulated itself from its neighbors, complementing an established\u00a0 military superiority. And this could provide additional maneuverability in\u00a0 future negotiations.<\/p>\n
Israel is\u00a0momentarily\u00a0 in a secure strategic position<\/a>. Syria will likely remain in a state of civil\u00a0 war for an extended period, and Lebanon remains fragile and fragmented. Israel\u00a0 maintains a working relationship with other neighbors, such as the Hashemite\u00a0 regime in Jordan, as well as Fatah and the Palestinian National Authority and\u00a0 the Egyptian military. This status quo seems unlikely to change in the short\u00a0 term. But although Israel is in a relatively stable position, it knows how\u00a0 mercurial the surrounding region is and will likely still behave proactively\u00a0 around national security issues.<\/p>\nIsrael’s proactive solution to ensuring water security is to develop\u00a0 additional domestic resources. Though this will require more imported energy in\u00a0 the short term, the continued development of domestic energy resources could act\u00a0 as a counter-balance, even as water resources become more\u00a0 energy-intensive.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n
Read more:\u00a0 Israel’s Water Challenge | Stratfor<\/a> Follow us: @stratfor on Twitter<\/a> | Stratfor on Facebook<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"\u0907\u091c\u0930\u093e\u0907\u0932\u00a0\u0915\u0940 \u00a0\u092a\u094d\u0930\u093e\u0915\u0943\u0924\u093f\u0915 \u0909\u092a\u092f\u094b\u0917\u0940 \u091c\u0932 \u0915\u0940 \u0930\u093e\u0936\u0940 \u092e\u093e\u0924\u094d\u0930 \u0968\u096c\u096b \u00a0\u0915\u094d\u092f\u092c\u093f\u0915 \u092e\u0940\u091f\u0930\u00a0 \u092a\u094d\u0930\u0924\u093f \u0935\u094d\u092f\u0915\u094d\u0924\u093f\u00a0\u092a\u094d\u0930\u0924\u093f \u00a0\u0935\u0930\u094d\u0937 \u0939\u0948 \u00a0\u091c\u094b… more
December\u00a0 25, 2013 | 0753 <\/i> Print <\/a> Text\u00a0 Size<\/div>\n Israel’s successful efforts to increase water\u00a0 security will lessen one of the country’s geographical constraints. But\u00a0 new sources of water are more\u00a0 energy intensive, and this could increase Israel’s short-term dependence on\u00a0 energy imports unless domestic energy sources are successfully\u00a0 developed.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n While Israel\u00a0 enjoys relative\u00a0national security<\/a>\u00a0compared to its neighbors, which\u00a0 are struggling with internal\u00a0 fragmentation, this will\u00a0probably change eventually. Because concerted military efforts\u00a0 have been required in the past to secure water resources, Israel has had a\u00a0 strong incentive to develop technological solutions to improve water security. Additional domestic water\u00a0 resources — including increasing desalination capacity and continued efforts to\u00a0 recycle water — allow Israel to\u00a0 mitigate one of its inherent geographic constraints.<\/p>\n Israel has substantially increased its capacity to desalinize water over the\u00a0 last decade. The arid country of roughly 8 million already has a number of\u00a0 desalination plants — including the Sorek plant, the world’s largest\u00a0 desalination plant of its kind, which became fully operational in\u00a0October. Israel has plans to increase total desalination\u00a0 capacity\u00a0through 2020 such that it approaches the estimated annual amount\u00a0 of internally generated natural\u00a0 water resources.<\/p>\n Israel’s total annual internal renewable natural sources of fresh water stand at 0.75 billion cubic meters. It has\u00a0 roughly 265 cubic meters per year of water per person available. This\u00a0 is\u00a0well below the U.N. definition of water poverty, which is anything below\u00a0 1,000 cubic meters per person per year.<\/p>\n For groundwater, Israel relies on two main aquifers: the Coastal Aquifer and\u00a0 the Mountain Aquifer (which is further divided into subaquifers). Both also lie\u00a0 under the Palestinian territory — in Gaza and the West Bank,\u00a0 respectively.<\/p>\n Israel’s surface water is concentrated mainly in the north and east of the\u00a0 country.\u00a0Israel is part of the Jordan River system, which also includes\u00a0 Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the West Bank. The major rivers in the upper part of\u00a0 the basin include the Hasbani, Banias and the Dan rivers. These rivers converge\u00a0 to form the Jordan River near the border of Israel, Lebanon and Syria before\u00a0 flowing into the Sea of Galilee. Downstream, the Jordan River is further fed by\u00a0 the major tributaries of the Yarmouk and Zarqa rivers.<\/p>\n Crucially, more than half of Israel’s\u00a0total natural water originates\u00a0 outside its borders: 310\u00a0million cubic meters come from Lebanon, 375 million cubic\u00a0 meters come from Syria and 345 million cubic meters originate in the West Bank.\u00a0 All the countries in this arid region compete for the limited resources of the\u00a0 basin. The Palestinian Authority has between 51 cubic meters per person and 333\u00a0 cubic meters per person per year depending on location, while Syria and Lebanon\u00a0 receive water from additional river systems and operate at 882 cubic meters per\u00a0 year per person and 1,259 cubic meters per year per person, respectively. Jordan\u00a0 has 161 cubic meters per year per person.<\/p>\n Allocations of water from transboundary river systems are often disputed. The\u00a0 last basin-wide allocation scheme for the Jordan River system came in 1955 with\u00a0 the Jordan Valley Unified Water Plan (also known as the Johnston Plan, named\u00a0 after the American ambassador involved in negotiations). By allocating water\u00a0 based primarily on agricultural demand, the plan offered a compromise between\u00a0 participating nations. However, because many of the Arab states did not want to\u00a0 recognize Israel, the plan was never ratified. Attitudes toward cooperative\u00a0 distribution strategies continued to sour during the construction of Israel’s\u00a0 National Water Carrier, which diverted water from the Sea of Galilee to other\u00a0 points in Israel. However, Jordan and Israel have used the Unified Plan as the\u00a0 basis for subsequent negotiations.<\/p>\n As one of the downstream riparian nations in the basin, protecting Israel’s\u00a0 northern borders is essential to maintaining control of surface water resources.\u00a0 Maintaining control of the Golan Heights not only gives Israel a military\u00a0 advantage in dealing with adversaries to the north, it also helps to guarantee\u00a0 access to the Sea of Galilee.<\/p>\n Israel historically has demonstrated a willingness to use military force to\u00a0 guarantee access to water resources. In 1964, Syria, with the support of the\u00a0 Arab League, began devising plans to divert the Banias River, threatening\u00a0 roughly 10 percent of Israel’s water supply at the time. From 1965-1967, Israel\u00a0 launched attacks to destroy the diversion projects under construction in an\u00a0 effort to maintain access to the water source.<\/p>\n Water rights and distribution parameters were included in the 1994 peace\u00a0 treaty between Israel and Jordan. The Oslo II agreement in 1995 between Israel\u00a0 and the Palestinian National Authority also outlined parameters for water\u00a0 cooperation in the West Bank, but in practice, joint management has often failed\u00a0 and the Palestinian population remains heavily dependent on Israel for access to\u00a0 water.<\/p>\n These treaties also did not remove Israel’s imperative to ensure continued\u00a0 access to water resources, nor its willingness to threaten military action to\u00a0 ensure it. In 2002, villages in southern Lebanon installed small pumping\u00a0 stations and irrigation pipelines on the Hasbani River. Ariel Sharon, Israeli\u00a0 prime minister at the time, claimed these actions constituted a “case for war”\u00a0 and threated military action. While no action was taken, the posturing\u00a0 illustrates Israel’s wariness of upstream water management schemes.<\/p>\n The foundations of Israel’s current water infrastructure system were laid in\u00a0 the 1950s and 1960s, when Israel faced a more volatile security situation.\u00a0 Subsequent decades saw further development of the efficient use of water and the\u00a0 development of alternative sources. As a result, Israel has expanded internal\u00a0 water resources without expanding its physical borders, helping mitigate the\u00a0 risk of international confrontations over water.<\/p>\n To the same end, Israel has also developed a highly organized water\u00a0 management system, effectively integrating the whole country. An early project\u00a0 known as the National Water Carrier, which comprises a series of canals,\u00a0 pipelines and pumping stations, moves water from the Sea of Galilee in the\u00a0 comparatively water-rich north to areas of higher demand and greater need in the\u00a0 central and southern zones.<\/p>\n Israel is also a pioneer and global leader in water-efficient irrigation\u00a0 technology. Because agriculture remains the largest water consumer in the\u00a0 country, efficient use in this sector is necessary for continued sustainable\u00a0 water management. In addition to the irrigation technology, by effectively\u00a0 treating roughly 400 million cubic meters of wastewater, using it mostly to\u00a0 irrigate crops, Israel further reduces pressure on water resources.<\/p>\n Although Israel has used desalination technology on a smaller scale since the\u00a0 1960s, the push for a substantial increase in desalination capacity began only\u00a0 after a major drought in 1998-1999. Several droughts over the course of the last\u00a0 15 years drove home the vulnerability of Israel’s water supply. Meanwhile, the\u00a0 overuse of groundwater resources, especially of the Coastal Aquifer, is\u00a0 degrading the quality of the water.<\/p>\n Israel currently consumes just under 2 billion cubic meters of water per\u00a0 year, and while water management has the ability to improve the efficiency of\u00a0 water usage, increasing populations in the region will continue to pressure\u00a0 these limited resources. These factors combined have pushed Israel toward\u00a0 desalination.<\/p>\n When the Sorek plant became fully operational in\u00a0October, Israel gained\u00a0 150 million cubic meters per year of desalination capacity. Total seawater\u00a0 desalination capacity is expected to reach 600 million cubic meters per year by\u00a0 2015 and could reach 750 million cubic meters per year by 2020. The production\u00a0 cost of desalinized water depends on the plant, but averages $0.65 per cubic\u00a0 meter, with the new Sorek plant costing roughly $0.50 per cubic meter. This is\u00a0 compared to $0.15-$0.45 for water from natural sources.\u00a0Advances in the\u00a0 technology that Israel uses, including technologies that improve the energy\u00a0 efficiency of the plants, have helped drive the costs down compared to previous\u00a0 desalination technology. But desalinated water remains far more energy-intensive\u00a0 than naturally sourced water, and it increases demands for power on the\u00a0 national\u00a0electricity\u00a0grid and from independent natural gas\u00a0 generators.<\/p>\n Because Israel has traditionally been an energy importer, increasing reliance\u00a0 on an energy-intensive water resource could in turn increase Israel’s dependence on energy-exporting\u00a0 nations. Natural gas will likely be the predominant fuel used to produce\u00a0 desalinated water. The Israeli electrical grid is projected to shift further\u00a0 toward natural gas and away from coal in the coming years, while the\u00a0 desalination plants often independently employ natural gas generators.<\/p>\n The total fuel required will vary based both on the type of desalination plant, as well as the type of power\u00a0 generation. Even with newer, more efficient equipment, the operation of more\u00a0 than 500 million cubic meters of desalination capacity could require more than\u00a0 100 million cubic meters of natural gas or the equivalent energy from some other\u00a0 fuel sources to produce the additional power necessary to run the plants.<\/p>\n Israel had previously been an importer of natural gas, but the total volume\u00a0 of imports has declined in recent years. As of\u00a0August 2013, imports were\u00a0 only accounting for 13 percent of total consumption. Furthermore, offshore\u00a0 discoveries in the eastern Mediterranean, including the Leviathan fields\u00a0 projected to come online as early as 2016, mean Israel has the potential to\u00a0 become a natural gas exporter. While there are many political and technical\u00a0 constraints surrounding the development and subsequent use of these\u00a0 fields<\/a>,\u00a0increased levels of domestic energy production could reduce dependence on\u00a0 foreign partners in terms of energy. This is especially important as Israel\u00a0 pursues a strategy of relying on more energy-intensive water resources.<\/p>\n Israel traditionally requires a third-party\u00a0sponsor to survive.\u00a0And\u00a0 even with the added desalination capacity, Israel may still need to use water\u00a0 from external sources. But it has successfully adjusted to the environment and\u00a0 better insulated itself from its neighbors, complementing an established\u00a0 military superiority. And this could provide additional maneuverability in\u00a0 future negotiations.<\/p>\n Israel is\u00a0momentarily\u00a0 in a secure strategic position<\/a>. Syria will likely remain in a state of civil\u00a0 war for an extended period, and Lebanon remains fragile and fragmented. Israel\u00a0 maintains a working relationship with other neighbors, such as the Hashemite\u00a0 regime in Jordan, as well as Fatah and the Palestinian National Authority and\u00a0 the Egyptian military. This status quo seems unlikely to change in the short\u00a0 term. But although Israel is in a relatively stable position, it knows how\u00a0 mercurial the surrounding region is and will likely still behave proactively\u00a0 around national security issues.<\/p>\n Israel’s proactive solution to ensuring water security is to develop\u00a0 additional domestic resources. Though this will require more imported energy in\u00a0 the short term, the continued development of domestic energy resources could act\u00a0 as a counter-balance, even as water resources become more\u00a0 energy-intensive.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n Read more:\u00a0 Israel’s Water Challenge | Stratfor<\/a> Follow us: @stratfor on Twitter<\/a> | Stratfor on Facebook<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" \u0907\u091c\u0930\u093e\u0907\u0932\u00a0\u0915\u0940 \u00a0\u092a\u094d\u0930\u093e\u0915\u0943\u0924\u093f\u0915 \u0909\u092a\u092f\u094b\u0917\u0940 \u091c\u0932 \u0915\u0940 \u0930\u093e\u0936\u0940 \u092e\u093e\u0924\u094d\u0930 \u0968\u096c\u096b \u00a0\u0915\u094d\u092f\u092c\u093f\u0915 \u092e\u0940\u091f\u0930\u00a0 \u092a\u094d\u0930\u0924\u093f \u0935\u094d\u092f\u0915\u094d\u0924\u093f\u00a0\u092a\u094d\u0930\u0924\u093f \u00a0\u0935\u0930\u094d\u0937 \u0939\u0948 \u00a0\u091c\u094b… more <\/div>\n\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Summary<\/h2>\n
\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Analysis<\/h2>\n
Naturally Occurring Water<\/strong><\/h3>\n
<\/a><\/div>\nExpanding Sources of Water: Conservation and\u00a0 Desalination<\/strong><\/h3>\n
<\/p>\nShort-Term Dependence on Imported Energy<\/strong><\/h3>\n
Outlook<\/strong><\/h3>\n