भारत चीन युद्ध की परिकल्पना ही भयावह है . दोनों देश अभी हाल ही मैं सदियों की गरीबी से बाहर निकल रहे हैं . अभी तो स्वस्थ , शिक्षा , घर इत्यादि अधिकाँश जनता को उपलब्ध नहीं है . ऐसे मैं एक युद्ध पिछले दस वर्षों की उन्नति की उपलब्धियों को समाप्त कर देगा . चीन भारत को तुच्छ समझने का आदि हो गया था . वह तिब्बत मैं निरी सड़कें बनाने पर भी भारत को सड़कें बनाने से रोकता था. यहाँ तक की भारतीय उच्चाधिकारियों के अरुणांचल दौरों पर आपत्ति जताता था .मोदी सरकार ने भारत की विदेशों मैं छवि तो बदल दी है . चीन को भी भारत को अपना समकक्ष समझने की आदत डालनी होगी .परन्तु आज भी चीन से सब देश दबे हुए हैं . भारत अपने सिलिगुरी की पतली व् संकरी ज़मीन पर चीनी गोलाबारी नहीं होने दे सकता . इसलिए भारत भी अपनी स्थिति मैं जम गया है .परन्तु भारत को पता होना चाहिए की कोई बड़ी शक्ति खुल कर भारत का साथ नहीं देगी .इसलिए यह लड़ाई भारत को अकेले ही लडनी होगी . इस लेख मैं भारत चीन के युद्ध के परिणामों पर चर्चा की गयी है .
एक बात सिद्ध है जिस चीनी जनरल ने यह सब शुरू किया था उसे इसका एहसास नहीं था की भारत अपनी सुरक्षा को दांव पर नहीं लगने देगा .अन दोनों पक्षों को इससे निकलने के उपाय खोजने चाहिए .
India – China. War Scenario – An American Evaluation
mountain passes. Despite the enormous size of both armies (1.2 million for the Indian Army and 2.2 for the Chinese Army) fighting on the ground would likely be a stalemate with little lost or gained.
The war at sea would be the decisive front in a conflict between the two countries. Sitting astride the Indian Ocean, India lies on China’s jugular vein. The Indian Navy, with its force of submarines, aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya and surface ships could easily curtail the the flow of trade between China and Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. It would take the Chinese Navy weeks to assemble and sail a fleet capable of contesting the blockade. Even then, the blockade would be hard to break up, conducted over the thousands of square miles of the Indian Ocean.
Meanwhile, shipping to and from China would be forced to divert through the western Pacific Ocean, where such diversions would be vulnerable to Australian, Japanese, or American naval action. 87 percent of the country’s petroleum needs are imported from abroad, particularly the Middle East and Africa. China’s strategic petroleum reserves, once completed sometime in the 2020s, could stave off a nationwide fuel shortage for up to seventy-seven days—but after that Beijing would have to seek an end to the war however possible.
The second-order effects of the war at sea would be India’s greatest weapon. War jitters, the shock to the global economy, and punitive economic action by India’s allies—including Japan and the United States—could see demands for exports fall, with the potential to throw millions of Chinese laborers out of work. Domestic unrest fueled by economic troubles could become a major problem for the Chinese Communist Party and its hold on the nation. China has no similar lever over India, except in the form of a rain of ballistic missiles with high-explosive warheads on New Delhi and other major cities.
A war between India and China would be nasty, brutal and short, with far-reaching consequences for the global economy. The balance of power and geographic constraints means a war would almost certainly fail to prove decisive. Both sides have almost certainly concluded this, which is why there hasn’t been a war for more than fifty years. We can only hope it stays that way.
_Kyle Mizokami is a defence and national-security writer based in San Francisco who has appeared in the Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and the Daily Beast._
mountain passes. Despite the enormous size of both armies (1.2 million for the Indian Army and 2.2 for the Chinese Army) fighting on the ground would likely be a stalemate with little lost or gained.
The war at sea would be the decisive front in a conflict between the two countries. Sitting astride the Indian Ocean, India lies on China’s jugular vein. The Indian Navy, with its force of submarines, aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya and surface ships could easily curtail the the flow of trade between China and Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. It would take the Chinese Navy weeks to assemble and sail a fleet capable of contesting the blockade. Even then, the blockade would be hard to break up, conducted over the thousands of square miles of the Indian Ocean.
Meanwhile, shipping to and from China would be forced to divert through the western Pacific Ocean, where such diversions would be vulnerable to Australian, Japanese, or American naval action. 87 percent of the country’s petroleum needs are imported from abroad, particularly the Middle East and Africa. China’s strategic petroleum reserves, once completed sometime in the 2020s, could stave off a nationwide fuel shortage for up to seventy-seven days—but after that Beijing would have to seek an end to the war however possible.
The second-order effects of the war at sea would be India’s greatest weapon. War jitters, the shock to the global economy, and punitive economic action by India’s allies—including Japan and the United States—could see demands for exports fall, with the potential to throw millions of Chinese laborers out of work. Domestic unrest fueled by economic troubles could become a major problem for the Chinese Communist Party and its hold on the nation. China has no similar lever over India, except in the form of a rain of ballistic missiles with high-explosive warheads on New Delhi and other major cities.
A war between India and China would be nasty, brutal and short, with far-reaching consequences for the global economy. The balance of power and geographic constraints means a war would almost certainly fail to prove decisive. Both sides have almost certainly concluded this, which is why there hasn’t been a war for more than fifty years. We can only hope it stays that way.
_Kyle Mizokami is a defence and national-security writer based in San Francisco who has appeared in the Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and the Daily Beast._
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