Review of Ministry of Defence ,DRDO and Pax Indica To Increase Its Effectiveness
The nation has been worried about the growing dissatisfaction in armed forces and disconnect between the ministry and the Armed Forces which has reached dangerous proportions now . Gen V.K.Singh episode has become fresh by his winning by highest margin after Narendra Modi himself. Naval Chief Joshi resigned but fires have continued unabated as did the dissatisfaction in Navy.The situation needs immediate review at the highest level .
Some observations/comments are given below.
• Very senior IAS officers with impeccable track records and integrity have been heard to say that defence related matters do not interest them nor do they understand them. This could be one of the reasons for the apparent disconnect between policy formulation/implementation vis-a-vis requirements expressed by the uniformed services in MOD and Department of Defence Production. How do you formulate policy and implement tens of thousands of crores worth of projects if you do NOT understand/have no prior experience of the issues and related ramifications with national geo-political priorities? Earlier practice of posting Addl Secretaries/Secretaries in these 2 Ministries only if they had sufficient stints earlier at Dy Sec/Director/JS level has been given the go-by.
• A recent article in Indian Express stated that Finance Ministry has turned down the (Army) proposal for augmenting the strike force in the North East because the “Chinese threat” was not that sufficiently long-term to warrant such expenditure. God help us. Other than the turf wars wherein, MOD felt that an integrated tri-service approach for the strike force (rather than Army-centric) is better, we have Finance mandarins deciding the extent and longevity of potential foreign threats! Takes us back to the George Fernandes days when urgent equipment for Siachen ops was not being sanctioned till RM said that concerned officials should visit Siachen for a first-hand appraisal of the requirements.
• This brings us back to the issue that IAS officers from Dy Secy level onwards and upwards from all Ministries must be rotated through MOD tenures to understand nuances of Armed Forces requirements. This MUST include mandatory trips to forward areas/field formations during different seasons/environment (desert, mountains and high altitudes, jungles, etc in peak summer, winter, monsooon) in which, apart from a full briefing, preferably when border incidents have just taken place, they should WALK around for a few kilometres to get a feel of ground situation and why particular equipment is required. This may also bridge the trust deficit between the civilians and the uniformed services.
• Revisit GOI Transaction of Business Rules to permit MOD to incur capital and revenue expenditure as per Budget sanctions (passed by Parliament) instead of referring it time and again to Finance Ministry in course of the Financial year. In the Railway Ministry, embedded IRAS officers from field units upwards and the executive officers at all levels have very precise Schedule of Powers laid down to permit such expenditure. This will enormously speed up the decision-making process. It will also avoid the spectacle of unspent funds being surrendered at the end of each Financial year and the mad scramble by everybody to loosen the purse strings in the last quarter to avoid strictures resulting in windfall gains to unscrupulous contractors.
• Before old timers start turning in their graves at this insidious attempt at financial profligacy, the consequences have to be clearly understood: CAG/CVC/CBI notwithstanding, speedy dismissal from service for any wrong-doings.
• Recent media reports cited the RM expressing his concern and need to balance transparency in defence procurement with urgent need for further acquisitions. Well said. But time and again, we have succeeded in throwing out the baby with the bath-water. By all means, blacklist/arrest the agents and sack officials engaged in murky dealings who have violated the declaration that no agents are involved in defence acquisitions . But, at the same time, why stop buying the equipment with enormous repercussions for defence preparedness and obvious delight of competitors who lost out in the bidding process. Ultimately, GOI suffers a setback and loses out due to selective leaks engineered at appropriate times whenever a force-multiplier is proposed to be inducted into the defence services.
• Back to DRDO.
It has had its ups and downs with spectacular successes and also dismal failures such as underpowered MBT, wrong size reactor for nuclear subs, inherently unstable liquid propellants instead of solid propellants for missiles etc.
o Instances of DRDO labs spending crores on equipment purchase every year to justify their existence with equipment remaining unutilised after purchase are well known. Many research reports are re-hashed based upon previous work. Loosening of purse strings with no questions asked because it is a holy cow to be nurtured at all costs, and a very talkative Head of DRDO highlighting projects that have not been fully conceptualised, leave alone been implemented, does not help.
o Why highlight features of the proposed AESA radar system which covers only 240 degrees and a limited range so that our neighbours across the border can draw up operational strategies to counter this. Why are alternate systems that can cover 360 degrees with extended range not being implemented? Why are ship-based UAVs to extend radar coverage to 2000 plus Kms to detect long-range missiles (cruise and SLBMs) not examined?
o In a cash-strapped economy, retro-fitment like the Tank-Ex project must be nurtured. Unfortunately, given the lure of foreign collaborations/trips/TOT projects, for obvious reasons, there is no enthusiasm in the Armed Forces for “jugaad” technology. More often than not, General Qualitative Requirements and Specs are changed and aligned with specific equipment suppliers with inevitable consequences.
• Abysmal production of nuclear weapons because of IAEA/NSG constraints. Even Pakistan is overtaking us. Look at the irony of it. We listed many more installations for IAEA inspection thereby limiting the locations where fissile weapon-grade material is produced hoping that these at least will get uninterrupted supply from NSG countries only to be tripped by the Liability Clause. Why was fast breeder technology not implemented 30 years back to tap the world’s largest thorium reserves in Kerala? Why was the programme allowed to be hijacked by the U-235 technology group (lure of foreign trips for reactor design/procurement)? Were screws being applied even then to limit progress in fast breeder technology?
• Silo approach where everybody (Ministries, Departmental Undertakings etc.) protects his turf developing independently of other actual requirement. Classic example is Agni I, where cumbersome deployment procedures spread over several hours defeats the very concept of Cold Start doctrine. There are instances where GSQRs are tweaked time and again so that DRDO units have to scramble to play catch-up. Non-synergy of resources/capabilities/achieving economies of scale is the crux of the problem.
• Fresh ground rules have to be drawn up:
o Set up a Technical Advisory Group (TAG), comprising peer group from Armed Forces, MOD, other Ministries, Think Tanks, PSUs, Industry reporting through NSA directly to PM. Cabinet Secretary and PPS to PM will be part of TAG.
o TAG will not overlap with Crisis Management Group, NDMA, JIC or any other committee whose meetings may be chaired by Cabinet Secretary/NSA. TAG functions should not be confused with any Watchdog Committees/Oversight Committees or special Expert Committees whose Terms of Reference are to report/submit their findings to a specific or apex Ministry. Above all, TAG must not get bogged down in setting up a Secretariat, finding space in overcrowded Delhi and drawing up Schedules of Power, Preambles, Definitions etc. TAG members shall be tapped for domain knowledge, skills/expertise on need-based approach with checks and balances to retain confidentiality.
o TAG will take a holistic view of type of technology, equipment, sources, costs, land acquisition and environmental issues, implementation strategies, time frames and total resources required as a total systems approach. TAG will decide the major stakeholders, who, singly or jointly will deliver the project as per specified time frames not only for defence- related assets but also logistics issues (ports, naval bases, border road connectivity/mobility, advanced landing airstrips, Tri-Services Command etc) which impinge on defence preparedness and defence doctrines required for multi-theatre operations.
o TAG will have the mandate for ensuring inter-ministerial coordination at appropriate level empowered for speedy decision-making. TAG will meet frequently (at least quarterly) as per pre-defined time schedules.
o Very discreet and comprehensive review of ALL projects (independent of CAG/media glare) by TAG.
o TAG will undertake a hatchet job and retire those projects and officials which are not proceeding as per mission objectives. You CANNOT have projects which are spaced out to coincide with the service tenure of the officials running the project and even after that, they do not meet end user requirements.
o Turf wars over control of NTRO and inter-departmental/service rivalry can be curbed if sole control is vested in TAG.
o TAG mandate must cover the larger picture including cyber warfare, cyber security, satellite-based tracking and weapon systems, expanding nuclear strike-proof strategic oil reserves/all-weather forward area armament stores etc.
• Churchill reportedly commented on Clement Atlee that he is a modest man with much to be modest about. We are similarly modest and timid with our incremental and apologetic approach for allocating defence budgetary expenditure as percentage of GDP whereas Pakistan and China both spend much higher percentages of their GDP on defence. This is galling when threat perceptions warrant exponential scaling up of defence assets. Some illustrative examples:
– if anti-ballistic missile shield is required, why only for Delhi and Mumbai. What is total requirement covering all significant assets all over the country, especially missile manufacturing units?
– Limited (single number) licensed production of submarines
– If total number of mobile launchers required are “X” covering all theatres, why are we setting up a fraction of X in various field formations?
– If ADS fleet is required, why settle for only 2 carrier groups. Work out total requirement and then work backwards to allocate resources. Similarly for other weapon systems, aircrafts, missiles, helicopters, radar installations etc.
–
– Why has it taken 4 years to set up 2 coastal radar surveillance stations out of 28 locations identified after the Mumbai attacks in 2008?
– We pat ourselves on the back for being on the threshold of achieving nuclear triad in delivery systems. A former Air Chief who talked about Air Force jurisdiction over space-based weapons was shouted down as exceeding his brief. Notwithstanding the crab mentality which is manifested in turf wars, is anybody looking into this?
The point is that adequate fund allocation for defence should be treated on par and same priority as fund allocation for food or fertiliser subsidies or for National flagship programmes for Poverty Removal.
• Coming to Pax Indica
o “Pax Indica” gives an overview of MEA’s efforts to manage and enhance India’s geo-political aspirations in the challenging backdrop of neighbouring countries equations vis-a-vis India.
o Juxtapose with Mr Kanwal Sibals’s article regarding debate on MEA’s ills in Mint Today on 14th August in which he states that:
– Rules of Business do not allow MEA to negotiate FTAs, lead WTO negotiations, deal with IMF & World Bank, backstop G-20 negotiations (?!), take charge of Climate Change negotiations, sign defence agreements or those in space and atomic energy, decide the country’s energy policies and negotiate energy deals etc.
– MEA’s role gets circumscribed by other Ministries involved in external dealings as part of the larger body of Indian “diplomats” dealing with “foreign policy”.
– Mid-level lateral entry into MEA may pose problems
– While IAS has numerous parking slots for non-performers, MEA does not have this opportunity(!!)
o The above views underline the turf wars at the highest echelons and the silo-approach which characterises our response to various situations. In the harsh reality of twenty-first century, forging economic and trade ties is the bedrock of diplomacy. India has been found to be painfully slow. The overwhelming sentiment expressed by African and Asian countries is that India talks too much but delivers very little from announced funding packages for Infrastructure Development (loan announcements vs actual loan disbursements vs actual project implementation) as compared to China which has consistently outpaced India in extending Financial and Technical assistance to Third World countries and making strategic inroads into neighbouring countries.
o It does not behove a country of India’s size to say repeatedly that we are not competing with China to cover our own inadequacies in quest for energy security or bolstering trade with select countries. MEA’s enthusiastic endorsement for increasing Indo-Vietnamese cooperation pushed ONGC to assist Vietnam for oil exploration in South China Sea. Whatever be the reasons cited for ONGC/OVL withdrawing from the area, the basic reason was that foreign diplomacy was not backed by adequate military support when facing Chinese intransigence over exploration in their perceived backyard. A telling indictment whose lessons have been noted by Vietnam, Philippines and other ASEAN nations facing their own problems with China that India is not yet ready for the Big League notwithstanding the blandishments by USA and Japan to engage India in “Strategic Partnerships”.
o The defining moments were when foreign policy imperatives coincided with speedy military support for President Gayoom in the Maldives in the 1980s or Gen. Sundarji was able to airlift troops to face the Chinese at Nathu La. The not-so- defining moments include foreign policy imperatives dictating to Gen. Sundarji to send in the IPKF to Sri Lanka to fight “with one hand tied behind the back”, unable to muster support in Fiji for a democratically elected PM of Indian origin who appealed for help (Australia and New Zealand helped him) or in recent times, the handling of Maldives.
o During the closing stages of the Gadhaffi regime in Libya, foreign news channels were giving details of the hourly costs incurred by NATO in enforcing naval blockade off Northern Libya or enforcing the no-fly zone. Despite grumbling about being over-extended in Iraq and Afghanistan and the EU crisis which was slowly emerging, the NATO countries incurred this expenditure as part of State Policy. Contrast with Ashley Tellis article during Rajiv Gandhi era, in which he had written about requirements for achieving true blue-water capability by the Indian Navy to protect Indian economic interests with almost an apologetic reference to the resources required to develop and sustain force-multipliers. There was derision in India that we are being overtly ambitious and “exceeding our brief to remain confined (as a bully/big brother?) in a small area as a Regional player”.
o Mind sets have to change if synchronization of minimum credible military deterrence (including second strike and third strike capability) with GOI foreign, economic and trade polices is to be achieved.
o After the demise of the Soviet Union, the newly formed Heads of State of CIS countries made a beeline to India. Apart from hearing pious platitudes, no meaningful economic, trade or military ties emerged. China was able to barge in and has pipelines, rail and road connectivity to evacuate oil and natural gas from Central Asia into China. Now we are trying with Tajikistan among other countries. Trying to establish rail connectivity between Afghanistan, CIS countries and going into Iran for evacuation through Chabahar port is fraught with threat of US sanctions for dealing with Iran. ONGC and OVL are on tenterhooks because the shale gas supply from USA and Canada may get jeopardised because of investment in Iran. Is our foreign policy in sync with judicious quest for energy security and suitable directives to Petroleum Ministry/other Ministries engaged in mineral exploration? Equally important, do we have the necessary military clout to establish and protect these infrastructure projects and personnel with the imminent departure of NATO and US forces from Afghanistan?
o MEA has tried to cobble together different entities to form JVs/consortium to focus their core competence skills in jointly exploiting and evacuation mineral/oil resources as part of energy security programmes. One such venture, ICVL comprising 5 major PSUs for exploiting coal from Mozambique and Indonesia is stuttering along with Coal India wanting to exit and coal yet to be mined in Mozambique due to local implementation issues. Not that private sector has fared better. Tata Steel in Mozambique, Essar in Zimbabwe, Arcelor Mittal in Liberia and Senegal, Jindal Group in Bolivia have faced problems. An objective analysis is required as to “lessons learnt” and compared with the Chinese model where Govt. Of China makes no distinction between State-owned enterprises and the private sector in single-mindedly pursuing whatever it takes to secure the mineral/oil/gas resources overseas.
o Pax Indica will entail exercising power with responsibility. Jingoistic posturing and grand-standing in Parliament about Aksai Chin and NEFA led to the 1962 debacle because of utter disconnect between GOI objectives and military preparedness to execute the GOI directives. Instead of running to UNSC, India must be seen to have the diplomatic, economic and military muscle to be able to, singly or in conjunction with other like-minded countries enforce whatever is required to protect its own national interests. Pax Indica will mean that India should have access to ports/airfields across a string of countries in Africa and Asia to allow unhindered movement of Special Forces if required, to handle Entebbe-type or Kandahar-type situations, engage simultaneously with Somali pirates or issues in the Far East, protect its shipping lines and movement of energy resources, whether it is Mozambique, Latin America, Indonesia or Afghanistan.
• NSA is already chairing an Inter-Ministerial group which looks at the infrastructure projects prioritised by GOI. Rather than yet another bureaucratic exercise of periodic meetings with battery of officers compiling Action Taken Reports on Minutes of previous meetings, there is a need for setting up a separate Special Advisory Group (SAG), distinct from TAG referred to earlier, with selected representatives across all services and disciplines with overreaching powers (other than that exercised in CCS and CCEA deliberations). SAG should have executive decision making and sweeping implementation powers with authority to take assistance from any Ministry, Government Body or entity, public or private with SAG reporting directly through NSA to PM. Issues of Central and State powers as seen in trying to implement NCTC have to be kept in mind by the SAG. We can learn from the way Homeland Security was set up in USA overcoming the fairly intense turf wars between CIA and FBI, State Dept vs Pentagon and often fractious Federal and State regulations with different parties (Republican and Democratic) controlling the different States.
• Mandate of SAG will be to lay down the ground rules to implement Pax Indica.
